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LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-UNION'S UNPROTECTED HARASSING
ACTIVITIES AS A REFUSAL To BARGAIN IN Goon FAITH-While bargaining for
a new contract, the union announced that it would engage in a "workwithout-contract" program designed to harass the insurance company employer into accepting its demands, in the event that no agreement was
reached prior to the expiration of the existing contract. When that contingency occurred, the program was instituted consisting of such activities
as refusing to write new business for a period, refusing to do customary
duties, engaging in "sit-in mornings," soliciting policyholder support against
the company, and mass demonstrations at the company's home office.1 The

1 Other harassing activities were refusal, after writing of new business was resumed,
comply with company reporting procedures; refusal to participate in sales campaigns;
reporting late to the office; "doing what comes naturally"; not attending special business
conferences; picketing and distributing leaflets; soliciting signed policyholders' petitions.
to
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union continued to attend bargaining sessions, but it informed its members
in a directive that"..• a satisfactory contract will be won in the field and
not at the bargaining table."2 The company thereupon charged the union
with a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of section 8 (b) (3) of the
Taft-Hartley amendment.a The National Labor Relations Board rejected
the Trial Examiner's recommendation to dismiss and entered a cease and
desist order against the union.4 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia unanimously refused to enforce the order.5 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting.6 Where a union's
conduct at the bargaining table is in apparent good faith, its concurrent use
of extrinsic economic weapons to force acceptance of its demands is not
inconsistent with good faith bargaining. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' lnterna;tional Union, AFL-CIO, (U.S. 1960) 80 S.Ct. 419.
The Wagner Act7 imposed upon employers the duty to bargain collectively with the representatives of their employees over all labor disputes between them regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.a
While the act was silent as to the substance or scope of this duty, a clear
dichotomy 0£ desiderata soon appeared. On the one hand, the Board and
the courts early read into the duty a standard of good faith. 9 The conventional statement of this standard required the employer to".•. enter into
discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a
basis of agreement.•.."10 Section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley amendment to
the act incorporated this judicially-created standard into an explicit statutory command.11 Section 8 (b) (3)12 extended the duty so defined to cover
unions, the principal motivation being to prevent unions from adopting, as
it was felt they had often done in the past, a: "take-it-or-leave-it attitude" at
the bargaining table.13 Judged solely by the good faith standard, the
union's actions in the principal case may not have met the statutory requirement. As the quoted directive to its members clearly shows, the union took
Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO, 119 NL.R.B. 768 at 771, n. 7 (1957).
s 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (b)(3).
4 Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO, note 2 supra.
5 Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, (D. C. Cir. 1958) 260 F.
(2d) 736, cert. granted 358 U.S. 944 (1959). The court of appeals, in a one-sentence opinion, unanimously adhered to its holding in Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir.
1955) 227 F. (2d) 409, cert. dismissed 352 U.S. 864 (1956), which refused enforcement to a
Board order, Textile Workers Union, 108 NL.R.B. 743 (1954), based on facts virtually
identical with those in the principal case.
6 The dissenting justices (Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker) would have remanded
the case and required the Board to consider unprotected harassing activities as evidence
of bad faith.
7 The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
s 49 Stat. 453 (1935) §8 (5). Now, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (a) (5).
9 iee note, 61 HARV. L. R.EV. 1224 (1948). See also Smith, "The Evolution of the 'Duty
to Bargain' Concept in American Law," 39 MICH. L. R.EV. 1065 (1941).
10 Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, (5th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 91 at 94.
11 The Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (d).
12 Note 3 supra.
13 See 93 CoNG. REc. 4135 (1947) and 93 CoNG. REc. 5005 (1947).
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an adamant positiont4 and then sought to win its acceptance, not at the
bargaining table, but rather by a campaign of unprotected,111 outside
harassing activities. The fact that the union continued to go through the
motions of bargaining is not controlling, for the very purpose of the good
faith standard is to distinguish between a sincere desire to bargain and a
mere sham.ta In short, it could have been held here that the union openly
adopted the very "take-it-or-leave-it attitude" that the good faith requirement was enacted to prevent.
The other branch of the dichotomy is implicit in the fact that Congress,
in imposing the duty to bargain collectively, did not intend to dictate the
means by which it was to be carried out or to permit any governmental intervention as to the substance of the ultimate agreement.17 As one draftsman put it, the act led the parties to the door of the bargaining room but
did not enter with them.ts This legislative philosophy was made explicit in
section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which qualified the duty to bargain
in good faith by stating, " ... but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession...•"10
Measured solely by this standard, the Court's holding that the union's
harassing activities were not inconsistent with the duty to bargain is quite
correct. Ultimately, any collective bargaining situation is resolved on the
basis of the relative positions of economic power of the combatants. The
union's ability to subject its opponent to economic harassment is a lawful
(albeit unprotected) and valuable addition to its bargaining arsenal. Inherent in the power that the Board felt it had, under the act, to deprive a
party of a lawful bargaining weapon is the power to dictate the course or
manner of the negotiations. This power could also include the compelling
of a concession or agreement which the party might not have had to make if
its bargaining position had not been weakened by governmental intervention.20
The principal case thus presents an anomalous situation in which the
Board and the Court reach diametrically opposed results on the same facts,
each result being fully consistent with one of two congressional commands
14 See

note 21 infra.
Section 7 of the Wagner Act declares the right of employees to engage in certain
"concerted activities." Section 8 of the same act protects this right by making it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with these concerted activities in certain ways.
Thus an "unprotected" activity is one with which an employer may interfere without
committing an unfair labor practice. If the union's actions here were held to be "protected," a cease-and-desist order could probably not have issued notwithstanding any finding of a refusal to bargain. However, the Court conceded, arguendo, that the actions were
not so "protected," citing Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
16 E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (9th Cir_ 1943) 133 F. (2d) 676. See also
Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 1401 at 1413 (1958).
17 See S. Rep. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1947). See also Senator Wagner's remarks
at 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935).
18 Senator Walsh, at 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935).
10 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (d).
20 See Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 1401 at 1530 (1958).
llS
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contained in the same section of the same act. The Court sought to avoid
the self-contradiction of section 8 (d) by reading the limiting language as
an express modification of the earlier command. Superficially, the section
is so written. The difficulty is that the act's legislative history shows that
Congress simply saw no inconsistency between the limitations of section 8 (d)
and the judicially-formulated good faith standard which they also enacted.21
If the duty to bargain in good faith is to have any meaning, it must require
that agreement be reached through an orderly bargaining process between
two parties having a sincere desire to reach an agreement in this manner
rather than by the more primitive means of trial by combat which the act
purports to supplant. Yet the limitations in section 8 (d), as illustrated in
the majority opinion, indicate that the agreement can be effected through
these primitive means so long as the parties effect the facade of sitting across
a bargaining table while the battle rages elsewhere. The Court, faced with
a case requiring decision, was forced to choose between the conflicting
desiderata. In so doing, it has qualified one part of the act to conform to
another, with the effect of stripping the process of collective bargaining,
which the act made the fundamental element of our labor relations law,
of much of its substance. This result is, of course, not effected merely by
authorizing harassing tactics during bargaining, but rather by the logical
results of a conclusion that the act requires no more than the formality of
going through the prescribed ritual at a bargaining table. The Court's
choice, however, appears to have been correct. For the alternative is to hold
that the government has the power, under the act, to regulate the bargaining
process and indirectly to affect the substance of the ensuing agreement,
which would be an even more drastic result than the emasculation of the
duty to bargain. It is apparent that the ultimate choice between these two
far-reaching alternatives is a basic congressional policy decision which goes
to the heart of our whole statutory labor relations scheme. As Congress is
seemingly unaware that a choice need be made, it is regrettable that the
Court treated the act's fundamental inconsistency as merely a resolvable
"tension.''22 Until Congress is made aware of the fact that it has enacted
two entirely inconsistent commands, it can hardly make the urgently needed
decision as to which of these our labor law is to follow.

William Y. Webb
21 Senator Pepper's statement at 93 CoNG. REc. 4363 (1947) illustrates this unawareness: ". • • I think we are coming to an awareness of the fact that when a party to a
dispute merely takes an adamant position, •.• and says 'take it or leave it', that is not
collective bargaining. • • ." After this endorsement of the traditional good faith standard,
he continued, " . . . labor organizations [have] the right . . . to use the economic power
that they have ••. to better themselves in their relations with their employer...." This
statement thus seems to foreshadow the limitations implicit in §8 (d) as the majority
interpreted that section in the principal case. Congress did feel that the Board had gone
"very far" into substantive matters through the good faith concept, but this was seen as a
misapplication of the standard. H. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 19, 20 (1947).
22 See principal case at 425.

